In this view trust is manifest as a behavior in which an individual puts herself at risk of an outcome dependent upon the actions of others. The most common approach to trust derives from Coleman (1990 see also Sztompka 1999).

Trust is a central theoretical variable within this tradition ( Ostrom 1998), and thus it is no surprise that a great deal of research has focused on how trust amongst individuals is created, destroyed, and evolves over time.

As a theoretical framework, IAD has continued to provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the types of institutions – conceptualized as combinations of various types of rules – that are more likely or less likely to support cooperative behavior in the face of CPR dilemmas, conditional on contextual factors such as the resource system, the resource units, the governance system, and the users ( Ostrom 2009). In contrast, early empirical work in the IAD tradition demonstrated that individual decision makers can, under some circumstances, learn to successfully manage common pool resources and avert the tragedy assumed by Hardin ( Ostrom 1990, 1998 Ostrom et al. Merely posing this question was at odds with the prevalent assumption underlying the “tragedy of the commons,” elucidated most famously in Hardin’s (1968) paper: resources managed as commons are inevitably degraded and the only options to avoid degradation are either government control or privatization. How can individuals learn to successfully manage common pool resources? Since the publication of Governing the Commons, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has addressed this issue. Introduction: the importance of trust and the challenge of complexity

Alter ego game over quota